A Conflicted Relationship between Moral Relativism and Speech Suppression
The Two Impulses Often Walk Together, With Little Sense
Moral relativism is a strange bird.
For those who champion the concept, somehow the assertion of a lack of distinctions (in terms of their worth) between manifold ideas is a supposedly sophisticated perspective.
Erasing the concept of value and confusing equality with sameness is, in fact, an utterly unnuanced view. The rise in moral relativism in our modern era and the rise in support for suppressing speech have been similar, and they have overlapping participants. Moral relativists are often the same as those who do not subscribe to the liberal value of free speech. There is thus a connection between these two impulses, as well as a contradiction at the core of that relationship.
Though it should be noted that opposition to free speech has been forwarded by staunch moralists, in history and—yes—in our own time as well, recent times have seen not merely moralists but also moral relativists support speech suppression.
The fear—among enemies of free speech—is that all ideas will be treated with equal merit, but only those who deny the concept of merit could possibly fear that all ideas will be (or should be) treated equally.
Moral relativism leads to a belief that all ideas are of equal value, and if all ideas are of equal value, then certain ideas must be suppressed because they are dangerous. For those paying some level of attention, this is immediately disquieting.
Open inquiry and open discourse are superior ideas to suppression of thought, but if you fear that free expression is dangerous because there is no hierarchy of value where good ideas win out over bad ideas (because there supposedly is no such thing as "better ideas"), then suppressing speech—in the name of suppressing thought—becomes almost rational.
It is irrational, however, as it is incoherent, because by seeking to suppress certain speech, there is an implicit value attached to it, admitting that some ideas are indeed preferable to others. The fear—among enemies of free speech—is that all ideas will be treated with equal merit, but only those who deny the concept of merit could possibly fear that all ideas will be (or should be) treated equally. This is the particular problem with relativism: a leveling impulse that mistakes aims for equality to be an assertion that value judgments are, in and of themselves, problematic.
A defense of free speech is a clear declaration that some viewpoints are superior to others and that thinking people can arrive at such conclusions reasonably, so long as they are allowed to speak (and therefore to think) freely.
Considering that the morally-relativist snake eats its own tail, suppressing bad speech while denying a hierarchy of value, the self-contradicting relativist speech-suppressor is an obvious clown to anyone willing to give the issue even a momentary glance. We should highlight and appropriately judge such clownishness, and not be afraid to do so.
[James M. Masnov is a writer, historian, and lecturer. He is the author of Rights Reign Supreme: An Intellectual History of Judicial Review and the Supreme Court, available here. His first book, History Killers and Other Essays by an Intellectual Historian, is available here.]