Review: The Machiavellian Moment by J.G.A. Pocock, Part Two
Second Installment of a Three-Part Review; Part of an Ongoing Book Review Series
In the second third of Pocock’s The Machiavelli Moment, it can be argued that a different form of urgency can be felt between when Pocock is discussing nuts and bolts history and when he discusses political history and ideas. Though his writing is never boring, the energy tends to pick up whenever he begins to explore ideas rather than timelines. This begins early in this second section when he discusses Machiavelli’s Il Principe. He remarks that “Il Principe is not a work of ideology… It is rather an analytic study of innovation and its consequences; but within that character, it proceeds straight to the analysis of the ultimate problem raised by both innovation and the decay of citizenship” (Pocock, 156).
Pocock, it seems, is representative of many intellectual historians, in that ideas—and especially the application of ideas—is of primary interest. This may seem somewhat obvious or even redundant, but it’s a point worth mentioning as it’s Pocock’s prevailing thesis in The Machiavelli Moment : ideas of republicanism spread across populations, centuries, and continents. The way these ideas were manifested, shared, and applied in a variety of ways over a significant period of time is indeed relevant.
A case in point is Machiavelli’s treatment of religion in context of the polity. As Pocock states, “if religion is a prerequisite of civic virtue… it is not virtue itself if that can exist only in a civic frame. [This is part of] Machiavelli’s subordination of religion to politics, his critique of Christianity on the grounds that it gives men other than civic values” (Pocock, 192). One can see the seeds of separation of church and state among the American founders in this notion. The motivations may have been different, and the idea of a direct line may be disputed, but one can nevertheless recognize a similarity of ideology in placing civic virtue front and center and placing religion off to the side in a way that makes it more private and less overtly necessary to the workings of a republic.
A similar aspect of republicanism advocated by Machiavelli which would be adopted, practiced, and celebrated by the Americans centuries later is his support of a citizen militia. Furthermore, combine other features of American republicanism such as land ownership and the importance of work, and suddenly the Machiavellian ideal is realized. Pocock asserts that Machiavelli believed that a “citizen called to arms, with a home and an occupation (arte) of his own, will wish to end the war and go home, where a mercenary, glad rather than sorry if the war drags on indefinitely, will make no attempt to win it” (Pocock, 200).
Whereas Machiavelli argued for a form of republicanism which was Roman in its model, even to the point of risking tipping toward empire, Guicciardini criticized Machiavelli’s “naivety of supposing that one can imitate Roman examples under very different conditions” (Pocock, 268). Furthermore, Guicciardini had little faith in Machiavelli’s idea of virtú “to denote the creative power of action to shape events… and did not use the term… to describe it” (Pocock, 269). Guicciardini also did not share Machiavelli’s belief that a popular citizen militia was the most salient feature of a republic. He does not reject the idea outright so much as he qualifies it, as Pocock asserts, “though Guicciardini will allow that a citizen army may make popular government strong and successful, he will not accept the thesis that the strongest and most successful form of government is a popular one because it generates a citizen army” (Pocock, 244-245). Thus, he believes that a citizen army is possibly a positive feature of a republic, it is however not its most important defining feature and may not even be a necessary one.
Another important figure to mention in the second section of the book is Donato Giannotti, who the English James Harrington in the mid-seventeenth century called “the most excellent describer of the commonwealth of Venice” and is known as the “intellectual heir of Machiavelli and the last major thinker in the Florentine republican tradition” (Pocock, 272). Pocock notes that Giannotti is not one whose thought greatly affected the minds of his age, yet he asserts that his argument that there are four things which constitute “the directive force” of every republic is an important feature of republicanism. These four features are “the creation of magistrates, the determination of peace and war, the making of laws, and the hearing of appeals” (Pocock, 283). Pocock mentioning that Giannotti’s influence in his own time was marginal at best yet noting that his writings would be influential on later English thinkers like Harrington seem to be at odds with his desire to trace a line from Florentine republicanism to the English variety to the early American republic. It isn’t entirely out of line, however, considering the fact that just because an idea may lie hidden for a period of time before it is then resurrected and discovered again later, this doesn’t mean that there is no line to be traced. In fact, the (re)emergence of ideas and maxims is precisely what makes intellectual history such a rich field of study. Ideas, as Pocock explains early in The Machiavellian Moment, are outside of space and time, and thus their reappearance after a long stage of dormancy does not mean that they cannot essentially be traced back to their source. Ironically, it might be argued that the very fact that ideas exist outside of space and time may be why they can be traced from one place (or time) to another, even with epochs of silence in between. This is not Pocock’s argument, but it is one nevertheless worth considering.
Giannotti may be most valuable for the way he seemed to strengthen and focus Machiavelli’s arguments regarding the importance of a citizen army. Pocock explains Giannotti’s contention that “If it is natural to men to bear arms… and if it is natural to them to follow citizenship, there can be no incongruency between the two, and this is much more than formal reconciliation: Giannotti goes on to argue that the militia is a powerful, indeed an indispensable, socializing and politicizing agency” (Pocock, 291). Giannotti also made compelling assertions that popular rule was the best form of republican government by noting that those who have been habituated to following laws (i.e. the people) are the best inclined to make them. That indeed “it is easier for one who knows how to obey laws to learn how to give commands than for one whose aim is always to command to subject his will to law. The habit of obeying a wide variety of laws gives the many a certain prudence” (Pocock, 311). This is a thoughtful form of advocacy for the rule of the many.
The second section of The Machiavelli Moment rounds out Pocock’s examination of Florentine republicanism. It is interesting to see how he explores its influence on English thinkers in succeeding centuries over the final third of the book. The third section is the one to be anticipated most, especially the final chapter which examines this influence upon the American republic. Studying the aspects of Florentine republicanism, in all its variations, however, is informative in creating a better understanding of the bridge of intellectual history which connects—to some degree—republicanism in the ancient world and aspects of natural law to republican thought in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Seeing where the dots are connected from this era through the enlightenment is certainly a beneficial experience.
[James M. Masnov is a writer, historian, and lecturer. He is the author of the forthcoming book, Rights Reign Supreme: An Intellectual History of Judicial Review and the Supreme Court. His first book, History Killers and Other Essays by an Intellectual Historian, is available here.]